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Abstract
The concept of capabilities, introduced originally by Sen, has inspired many researchers but
has not found any simple formal representation which might be instrumental in the construction of
a comprehensive theory of equality.
In a previous paper (Keiding, 2005), we investigated whether preferences over capabilities as
sets of functionings can be rationalized by maximization of a suitable utility function over the
set of functionings. Such a rationalization turned out to be possible only in cases which must be
considered exceptional and which do not allow for interesting applications of the capability approach
to questions of health or equality.
In the present paper we extend the notion of rationalizing orderings of capabilities to a
dynamical context, in the sense that the utility function is not yet revealed to the individual at
the time when the capabilities are ordered. It turns out that orderings which are in accordance with
such probabilistic utility assignments can be characterized by a smaller set of the axioms previously
considered.
Keywords: Capabilities, characteristics, equality of health.
JEL classification: D63, I10
1. Introduction
In recent years, the capability approach suggested by Sen (1980, 1985) has been
applied in several different fields of economics, including research in poverty and
inequality. The capability of an individual is defined as a set of functionings, each of
which describes a way of transforming an intial given situation to a final outcome. A
1 Author’s address: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455
Copenhagen K.
Email: Hans.Keiding@econ.ku.dk
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recent approach to the measurement of standard of living using functionings as a basic
concept is Gaertner and Xu (2005).
Following the by now well-established approach to capabilities, we view the latter as
sets of functionings. When it comes to specifying the nature of these functionings, the
literature is less explicit, and this is of course unfortunate, as a more detailed explanation of
what functionings are would be helpful in establishing possible properties of capabilities.
In particular, the question of whether there is a sufficient supply of capabilities (that is
whether capabilities, considered as sets, can take sufficiently many different forms) matters
for the problem of rationalizing capabilities, finding out whether or not any well-behaved
ordering of capabilities can be derived from an ordering of functionings. The answer
to the rationalizability problem, in its turn, matters for deciding what is the primitive
concept, functionings or capabilities. If functionings are the primitives, then an ordering of
capabilities should have an explanation in terms of an underlying ordering of functionings
(so that one capability is better than another if its best functioning in the first set is better
than the best functioning in the other set). If orderings of capabilities cannot be explained in
this way, then capabilities have intrinsic value over and above the constituent functionings;
this may well be the case but it means that the theory of capabilities is left with a white
spot still unexplored.
In a first paper on this problem (Keiding, 2005), we considered axioms on sets
of capabilities and orderings on this set such that the ordering could be rationalized as
maximization of a utility function defined on functionings. The results obtained were
largely negative in the sense that many reasonable orderings could not be rationalized in
this way, or, otherwise put, some of the axioms were rather more restrictive than what is
desirable. In the present paper, we therefore modify the notion of rationalizing an ordering,
allowing for situations where the utility on functionings becomes known only on a later
stage, after the ranking of capabilities has taken place. This seems to fit well with (at
least some of the) literature on capabilities, where the latter are seen as expressing the
possibilities of later choice in life.
The paper is structured as follows. In the section 2, we introduce the notion of
dynamic rationalization, understood as a ranking which is consistent with expected utility
over the capability set for some given probability measure on the set of (linear) utility
assignments on functionings. Section 3 gives the characterization result, and Section 4
contains a short discussion of the results obtained.
2. Capabilities as sets of functionings; the options approach
In this section, we develop the formalism to be used throughout the paper. A
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functioning is an element y of RL, L-dimensional Euclidean space. In accordance with
the intuitive concept of functioning as a certain place to be filled in society, comprising
productive as well as other activities, we shall allow for negative as well as positive
coordinates in y. This makes functionings formally identical to net trade vectors in
economic theory, but their interpretation may be different.
A capability C is a set of functionings, so C is a subset of RL. Keeping in mind the
analogy with production sets, it seems reasonable to assume that capabilities are closed,
convex, and comprehensive in the sense that if x ∈ C and y ∈ RL satisfies yh ≤ xh for
h = 1, . . . , L, then y ∈ C. Clearly, capabilities may have other formal properties as well,
derived from the role which they play in application. To approach this problem, we study
families C, considered as possible sets of all potentially feasible capabilities.
For our subsequent reasoning, it is convenient to assume that C is rich enough
to contain some distinguished sets, in particular C contains the negative orthant R−
(corresponding to the functionings which can produce no net output of anything) and
permits the operation of (Minkowski) weighted averages, i.e. if C, C ′ ∈ C and λ ∈ [0, 1],
then the set
λC + (1− λ)C ′ = {y ∈ RL+ | y = λx + (1− λ)x′, x ∈ C, x′ ∈ C ′}
belongs to C as well. We shall say that a family C with these properties is regular.
In our present setup, the capabilities approach to QALY measurement would imply
that there is an ordering (to be more precise, a complete preorder, that is a binary relation
which is reflexive, transitive and complete) ∼ on the sets C ∈ C; we let  and ∼ denote
the associated strict order and indifference, respectively. For completeness of exposition,
we state this as a first axiom.
In this paper, we shall be concerned with rationalizability of orderings ∼ on a set of
capabilities, whereby we understand that the ordering of capabilities can be derived from
an underlying ordering the functionings. We distinguish between two different types of
rationalizability: The ordering ∼ of C is simply (or statically) rationalizable by the linear
utility function u : RL → R if
C ∼C ′ ⇔ maxCu > maxC′u.
This notion of rationalizability was investigated in Keiding (2005), where it was shown
that static rationalizability can be obtained only upon rather restrictive conditions on the
family C. Here, we extend the notion of rationalizability to allow for a situation which
may be considered as closer to the intuitive content of capabilities and functionings: An
ordering ∼ on C is dynamically rationalizable if there is a random linear utility, that is a
(measurable) map u˜ : X → (RL)∗, where (X,X, P ) is a probability space, such that
C ∼C ′ ⇔ EP [maxC u˜] > EP [maxC′ u˜].
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In the interpretation, we assume that the individual may have access to the functionings
of given capability set, but that the preferences over functionings are revealed only at
a later point of time. Thus, at the moment where the capability is evaluated, only the
probabilities of the possible utility functions over functionings are known, not the actual
utility functions. Therefore, evaluation is performed by taking averages over the value of
the capability given the utility function drawn.
To see that the two forms of rationalizing orderings are effectively different, consider
the simple example in Figure 1, where the family C of capabilities contain the triangles
A and C and the rectangle B. Assume now that A ∼ C ∼B. This ordering cannot be
rationalized in the static way, since a linear form on R2 which attains the same maximum
on A and C must belong to {u ∈ R2 | u1 ≤ 0 or u2 ≤ 0}, and for each such u, this
maximum (which is = 0) is equal to the maximum on B.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to define a utility process u˜ such that the ordering
is rationalized in the dynamic way; indeed, suppose that
u˜ =
{
(1, 0) with probability 1/2
(0, 1) with probability 1/2 .
Then E [maxAu˜] = E [maxC u˜] > E [maxBu˜], so that the ordering ∼ is indeed recovered
by probabilistic utility maximization.
We have a characterization of dynamically rationalized orderings of families of
capabilities which uses support functions of convex sets. For C ⊂ RL a capability,
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the support function of C is the map δ∗(· | C) : → R+ defined by
δ∗(· | C) = sup {u · x | x ∈ C};
the support function is convex, and it characterizes the capability C fully, in the sense that
if g : → R+ is a convex function, then g(u) = δ∗(u | Cg), all u ∈ , where
Cg = ∩u∈{x ∈ R | u · x ≤ g(u)}.
Theorem 1. Let C be a family of capabilities ordered by ∼ , and suppose that ∼ is
dynamically rationalized. Then there is a probability measure P on  such that
C ∼C ′ ⇔
∫

δ∗(u | C) dP (u) ≥
∫

δ∗(u | C) dP (u).
Proof: This follows immediately from the definition of dynamic rationalizability, since
the random utility u˜ : X → gives rise to a probability measure P on  defined by
P (A) = P˜
(
u˜−1(A)
)
for all Borel sets U of , and clearly EP˜ [maxC u˜] =
∫
 δ
∗(u | C) dP (u).
If C is a set of capabilities, then an ordering ∼ of capabilities induces an ordering
∼ ∗ of their support functions in the obvious way. It is seen from Theorem 1 that (C, ∼ )
is dynamically rationalizable if and only if ∼ ∗ is the ordering derived from integration
with respect to a suitable probability measure on .
3. Properties of rationalizable orderings of capabilities
In this section, we present a characterization of dynamically rationalizable orderings
of families of capabilities. The axioms to be used are the Axioms 1 – 3 from Keiding
(2005), which for completeness are listed below:
Axiom 1. The preference relation ∼ on the family C is a complete preorder, and it is
continuous in the sense that {C ′ | C ∼C ′} and {C ′ | C ′ ∼C} are closed (in the topology
on C induced by the Hausdorff distance) for all C ∈ C.
We assume that the indifference relation ∼ is stable under averages:
Axiom 2. Let (C1, C2) and (C ′1, C ′2) be pairs of elements of C with C1 ∼ C2, C ′1 ∼ C ′2,
and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
λC1 + (1− λ)C ′1 ∼ λC2 + (1− λ)C ′2.
Axiom 3. If C1 ⊂ int C2, then C2  C1.
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As in our previous discussion of these axioms, we fell reasonably comfortable with the
Axioms 1 and 3, whereas Axiom 2, dealing with mixtures of capabilities, is less intuitive.
We return to the axioms at the end of the paper.
The following is straightforward:
Theorem 2. Let C be a rich family of capabilities ordered bu ∼ , and suppose that ∼
is dynamically rationalized. Then ∼ satisfies Axioms 1 – 3.
Proof: To show that Axiom 1 holds, let (Cn)n∈N be a sequence of capabilities with
Cn ∼C converging to C0 in the Hausdorff topology. Using Theorem 1 we have that there
îs P such that ∫

δ∗(u | Cn) dP (u) ≥
∫

δ∗(u | Cn) dP (u)
for all n ∈ N. Since the map C ′ → δ∗(· | C ′) is continuous, we get that∫

δ∗(u | C0) dP (u) ≥
∫

δ∗(u | C0) dP (u)
or C0 ∼C, and we conclude that the set {C ′ | C ′ ∼C} is closed for every C ∈ C.
Closedness of {C ′ | C ∼C ′} is established in similar way.
For Axiom 2, let (C1, C2) and (C ′1, C ′2) be pairs of elements of C with C1 ∼ C2,
C ′1 ∼ C ′2, and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. Using the definition of support functions, we have that
δ∗(u | λCj + (1− λ) | C ′j) = λδ∗(u | Cj) + (1− λ)δ∗(u | C ′j),
j = 1, 2, for each u ∈ , so that∫

δ∗(u | λCj+(1− λ) | C ′j) dP (u)
= λ
∫

δ∗(u | C1) dP (u) + (1− λ)
∫

δ∗(u | C ′1) dP (u),
j = 1, 2, we get from repeated use of Theorem 1 that λC1+(1−λ)C ′1 ∼ λC2+(1−λ)C ′2.
Axiom 3 follows easily from the fact that δ∗(u, C1) < δ∗(u, C2) for all u ∈ .
To proceed we need a general result about topological vector spaces.
Theorem 3. Let (V,≥) be an ordered topological vector space with positive cone
V+ having nonempty interior, let A be a convex cone contained in V+, and let ∼ be a
continuous total preorder on A. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) ∼ is monotonic (in the sense that x, x′ ∈ A, x ≥ x′ implies x∼ x′) and satisfies
the following condition: If x, x′, y, y′ ∈ A with , and λ, µ ∈ R+, then
[x∼ y, x′ ∼ y′, λx + µx′ ∈ A, λy + µy′ ∈ A] ⇒ λx + µx′ ∼ λy + µy′. (1)
(ii)∼ has a utility representation u, where u = v|A : A → R+ is the restriction to
A of a positive linear form u on V .
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Proof: (ii)⇒(i): Since for x, x′ ∈ A, x∼ x′ if and only if u(x) ≥ u(x′), and u is the
restriction of a positive linear form on V , we have immediately that ∼ is monotonic. The
second condition in (ii) follows similarly: If u(x) ≥ u(y) and u(x′) ≥ u(y′), then by
linearity of u we get that
u(λx + µx′) = λu(x) + µu(x′), u(λy + µy′) = λu(y) + µu(y′),
and the conclusion follows.
(i)⇒(ii): Choose an element x of A with x  0 (such an element exists since 0 is
minimal for ∼ by monotonicity). Clearly, λx  x for λ > 1 and x  λx for λ < 1. Let
I(x) = {x′ ∈ A | x′ ∼ x} be the set of elements of A which are equivalent to x in ∼
(that is, such that x′ ∼ x and x∼ x′). Using (1) with y = y′ = x we get that I(x) is the
intersection of A with an affine subset in V ; we write this set as K + {x}, where K is a
closed subspace of V .
By monotonicity, the set K does not intersect int V+, and by the Hahn-Banach theorem
(see, e.g., Rudin (1973), Theorem 3.4), there is a continuous linear form v on V such that
v(x) = 0 for x ∈ K and v(x) > 0 for x ∈ int V+. It is easily seen that u = v|A satisfies
the conditions in (i).
Now we may prove a converse of Theorem 2, giving us the desired characterization
of dynamically rationalized orderings of capabilities.
Theorem 4. Let C be a family of closed, convex, and comprehensive subsets ofRL, and
assume that if C contains sets C and C ′ , then it contains also λC +µC ′ for all λ, µ ∈ R+.
If ∼ is a an ordering of C which satisfies Axioms 1 – 3, then there exists a probability
space and a random utility on this probability space rationalizing ∼ .
Proof: Let V = C() be the set of continuous real functions on , endowed with the
topology of uniform convergence. Then V is a topological vector space, and its positve
cone (the set of all nonnegative functions on ) has nonempty interior (consisting of the
strictly positive functions).
We define the set A = {δ∗(· | C) | C ∈ C}. Since λC + µC ′ ∈ C for all C, C ′ ∈ C
and λ, µ ∈ R+, and δ∗(· | λC) = λδ∗(· | C), δ∗(· | µC ′) = µδ∗(· | C ′) we have that A
is a convex cone.
Define the preorder ∼ on A in the obvious way, that is by
δ∗(· | C)∼ δ∗(· | C ′) ⇔ C ∼C ′
(since this is basically the “same” ordering, only transferred from sets to their support
functions, we have kept the same notation). We leave it to the reader to check that ∼ is a
continuous preorder on A (the continuity part was shown in the proof of Theorem 2).
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Monotonicity of ∼ defined on A is a straightforward consequence of Axiom 3.
Similarly, it is easily seen that (1) follows from Axiom 2. We thus have that all the
conditions in (i) of Theorem 3 are fulfilled.
Using now Theorem 3, we get that ∼ has a utility representation U , which is the
restriction to A of a positive linear form on V = C(). By the Riesz representation
theorem (see e.g., Rudin (1966), Thm.6.19), a positive linear form on V can be identified
with a probability measure P on , so that
U(δ∗(· | C) =
∫

δ∗(u | C) dP (u),
which by Theorem 1 is exactly the expression of dynamic rationalizability.
4. Concluding remarks
In this second paper on the foundations of capabilities, we have investigated another
interpretation of capabilities, namely the options approach, according to which the
capability of an individual expresses the possibilities of choosing between several different
ways of functioning in society, whereby the emphasis is on possibility of choice, to
be exercised when more is known about the advantages and disadvantages of different
functionings. In our formalization the idea of choosing after having obtain additional
information is reduced to a choice to be performed after the utility function has been
revealed. This means that for our initial ordering of capabilities, the utility function on
functionings is known only probabilistically, with a given density of utility assignments.
Parallel to what we did in the first paper, we have investigated properties of orderings
of capabilities which arise from the above type of probabilistic utility maximization. It
turns out that we can characterize such orderings by the first three of the four axioms
already considered, combined with the assumption that the set of capabilities is large
enough to contain particular sets which we need in order to apply the axioms.As we noticed
above, among the three axioms characterizing the dynamically rationalized orderings of
capabilities, Axiom 2 on mixtures of capabilities stands out as less intuitive than the two
others. First of all, it relies on the notion of a mixture of two capabilities, defined as the
totality of all mixtures of functionings from the two capabilities (with fixed coefficients).
Once the idea of scalar multiples of functionings and capabilities have been accepted, it
might not be overly restrictive to assume that orderings are robust with respect to taking
mixtures. On the other hand, the demand that scalar multiples of capabilities should be
meaningful does of course put some restrictions on the possible applications.
To interpret the result of this second paper, it is useful to go back to the starting
point for the axiomatic approach to ordering capabilities: Why are we at all interested
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in such orderings? The point here is that in order to use capabilities for measuring
inequality, we would like capabilities to be ordered in a more or less objective way,
making it possible to decide whether or not an individual is better or worse off getting one
capability instead of another; in the absence of such a common scale of preferences we
would have to be satisfied with weak measures of inequality such as non-envy or egalitarian-
equivalence, which clearly are much less appealing that standard equality measures. Our
result shows that the members of a reasonably broad class of orderings on capabilities are
uniquely determined by a probability distribution over utility assingments. Assuming this
probability distribution given in society, a unique ranking of capabilities will emerge. This
is a much better result than what we obtained in the first paper, where orderings related
directly to utilities, that is to subjective properties of the individual, and therefore could
not reasonably be taken as valid for all individuals in society. With the options approach
to capabilities, it does make sense to speak of objective ranking of capabilities as better or
worse. In this sense, the results of the paper may be seen as a possibility result opening
up for measuring inequality through capabilities. Needless to say, this measurement faces
many other problems than the conceptual one considered here, but at least we have moved
one step towards the goal.
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